Philosophy and consciousness 

Heraclitus the dark mystic

Philosophy tries to understand life, and at the base of it is the understanding that it is not enough to live life in order to understand them, it is the reveres; our personal involvement with our life does not allow us to understand what is happening in them.

Life without an understanding of it, is mechanical, automatic, and superficial. It is the knowing of what is going on in our life which brings it to the level of really living.

We are also alive when we asleep, but we have no knowing, we are only alive physically but not alive in our consciousness. 

If one gets a hard blow on the head, he can become unconscious, he is alive, but without any knowing about it, so for him he is not alive.

If one is kissed by a loved one and he is asleep, was it for him a kiss, if he did not know that it happened? So, to live is to know, life without knowing what goes on is a sleepy, unconscious life.

But philosophy by itself is not enough, a real knowing could only be gotten to by ‘a state of consciousness’, which is expendable, versatile, and has adaptability.

Consciousness and consciousness state are a subjective medium’ that only with it can the philosophy try to understand something about objective reality.

Philosophy is an objective field, without any relation to a particular person. But without a very subjective, very personal consciousness state – it is not possible to penetrate to the more meaningful dimensions of life and existence.

The high level of consciousness of is: opening, expanding and is peeling of the outer layers of that which is in a process of understanding.

An approach to the understanding of life without the proper consciousness state – will be blocked by the walls of: superficiality, one dimensionality, flatness.

Consciousness operates on three perspectives:

1. To perceive what has been pushed to the sides. The horizontal plan.
2. To perceive what is bellow, from above. The vertical plan.
3. To perceive from inside. The depth plan.

On the horizontal dimension, the consciousness expands the narrow borders of perception, to be able to perceive a large spectrum of concepts and subjects. 

On the vertical dimension the consciousness excels above the low, material, linear and flat level, and to understand the higher, more spiritual levels of our life.

On the depth dimension the consciousness peels off the outer layers and to penetrate into the hidden level, the one under the surface, one of those levels is the subconscious. 

So, a proper consciousness state allows one to see reality from above, from the inside and from the wide spectrum which is outside the part that the person is in at any given time. For it is the space, the depth and the height from which we observe something – which allows us a greater understanding. 

Without developed consciousness our perception is:

1. Locked in a partial segment of reality.
2. Berried in the lower and material levels of reality.
3. Being held and stopped in outer plan of what exists in reality. 

Without the mediation of consciousness we perceive reality in its outer parts, in its lower levels and its partial parts.

Without a developed consciousness, philosophy is intellectual, meaningless. It chews again and again what is already known.

From a consciousness view point we walk instead of being able to fly. 

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